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UNBRIDLED POWER AND THE WILD HORSES AND BURROS ACT
Fundfor Animals, Inc. v. US. Bureau ofLand Management'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wild Horses and Burros Act ("Act") was Congress' attempt to
protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros that are "living symbols of
the historic and pioneer sprit of the West."2 Congress gave the Secretary
of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management ("Bureau") the
responsibility and the power to enforce, administer, and implement the
provisions of the Act.3 Overpopulation threatened various wild horse and
burro herds in 1999-2000, and in response, the Bureau implemented a
removal strategy that Congress funded and approved.4 In 2001, Fund For
Animals, Inc., a non-profit animal protection organization, filed suit
against the Bureau, alleging violations of both the Act itself and the
National Environmental Policy Act.s Fund For Animals specifically
challenged the Bureau's "Presidential Budget Initiative," its "Instruction
Memorandum," and seven specific removals, or "gathers," executed under
the Bureau's strategy. 6 The case was ultimately dismissed because the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that neither the
"Initiative" nor the "Memorandum" constituted a "final agency action" for
purposes of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), and Fund For Animals' claim requesting injunctive relief from
the gathers was moot.7  The Court of Appeals found the claim moot
because at the time the case was decided, the gathers had already taken
place, and the Court refused to apply the mootness doctrine of "capable of
repetition yet evading review."8 By ruling that the Bureau's strategy was
not subject to judicial review and refusing to apply the "capable of
1 Fund For Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
2 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
3 16 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
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repetition yet evading review" exception to the individual gathers, the
Court gave the Bureau ultimate power over the fate of the wild horses and
burros and made their gather decisions untouchable. This decision leaves
Fund For Animals, and other similarly situated litigants, with unrealistic
means of challenging the Bureau's actions under the Act.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1971, Congress passed the Wild Horses and Burros Act giving
the Secretary of the Interior jurisdiction over all wild free-roaming horses
and burros living on federal land.9 Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary is
responsible for "manag[ing] wild free-roaming horses and burros in a
manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural
ecological balance on the public lands."' 0 The stated purpose of the Act is
to protect wild horses and burros from "capture, branding, harassment, or
death."" The Act became the subject of controversy between the Fund
For Animals organization and the Bureau, who acts as the Secretary's
delegate. 12
In its role as the Secretary's delegate, the Bureau controls the
federal land at issue through localized "herd management areas."l 3 The
Bureau's management responsibilities include determining the
"appropriate management level" of wild horse and burro populations for
that given area. 14 According to the Bureau, an appropriate management
level reflects "the median number of adult wild horses or burros
determined through [the Bureau's] planning process to be consistent with
the objective of achieving and maintaining a thriving ecological balance
9 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
'Old. § 1333(a).
" Id. § 1331.
12 Fund For Animals, 460 F.3d at 15.
" 16 U.S.C. § 1332(c). These herd management areas were "established in accordance
with broader land use plans." Fund For Animals, 460 F.3d at 15 (citing 43 C.F.R. §
4710.1 (2000)). The Bureau established herd management areas in ten western states,
and the Bureau's local field and state offices manages each particular area. Id. At the
time Fund For Animals was decided, there were 210 herd management areas. Id.
14 Fund For Animals, 460 F.3d at 16.
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and multiple-use relationship in a particular herd area."i 5 In order for the
Bureau to effectively control and manage overopulation, it is necessary
to determine an appropriate management level. The Act mandates that
when the Bureau determines that a given area is overpopulated with wild
horses and burros, the Bureau must "immediately remove excess animals
from the range so as to achieve appropriate management levels."' 7
However, before the Bureau can take such action, it must prepare "a
detailed 'gather' plan, including an environmental assessment in
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act."' 8
In 1999, the Bureau faced a significant problem with population
explosion and low funding.19 As a solution, the Bureau "developed a
strategy to achieve nationwide [appropriate management level] and justify
increased funding for the program., 20  With input from state Bureau
offices regarding specific needs for local herd areas, the national Bureau
office reviewed several options and decided on a plan that would "achieve
nationwide [appropriate management levels] in five years at a cost of an
additional $9 million per fiscal year from 2001 through 2005."21 The
Bureau presented its plan to Congress in February 2000 as a "Presidential
Budget Initiative." 22 The Initiative stated that "one of the major threats to
watershed health is an overabundance of wild horses and burros on
rangelands," and that as a result of "current funding capability and
1 Id. There is no set formula for calculating an appropriate management level, because
each Bureau office has "significant discretion to determine their own methods of
computing [appropriate management level] for the herds they manage." Id. The
discretion in determination among local offices ranges from finding a level that reflects
"the midpoint of a sustainable range" or as a "single number." Id.6 id.
17 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (2000). Removing the animals may include adoption for young
and healthy horses, sale in certain circumstances, placement in private long-term
pasturing arrangements, or humane slaughter. Id.
18 Fund For Animals, 460 F.3d at 16. "Gather decisions are subject to administrative
appeal." Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4770.3 (2000)).
Id. In 1999, the nationwide wild horse and burro population was around 46,000
(approximately 19,500 above nationwide appropriate management level). Id.20 d
21 id.
22 Id. The formal title was "The Restoration of Threatened Watersheds' Initiative," and it
was subtitled "Living Legends in Balance with the Land: A Strategy to Achieve Healthy
Rangelands and Viable Herds." Id.
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adoption demand," "the populations of these animals will increase at a rate
faster than [the Bureau's] ability to remove excess animals." 23 Through
the Initiative the Bureau asked for "additional appropriation" that would
"enable the field offices to meet removal targets based on an initial four-
year gather schedule," and would result in a "large number of removals in
the early years of implementation and a gradual decline to maintenance
levels." 4 Also included in the Initiative were strategies for "eliminating
age restrictions on removals, enhanced marketing of animals and adoption
events, and an expanded program of training and gelding for difficult-to-
adopt animals." 25 Congress approved the additional appropriations, and
the local field offices began implementing the strategies outlined in the
Initiative. 26
In 2001, the Fund For Animals and others challenged the Bureau's
Initiative strategy under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"). 2' Fund For Animals filed suit in district court alleging that the
Bureau had violated the NEPA by "implementing the strategy without first
preparing an environmental impact statement,"28 the Bureau violated the
Act by "adopting a strategy that would reduce herd populations to below
their appropriate management levels," 29 and the complaint objected to
seven specific gathers of wild horses and burros carried out under the
strategy approved and funded by Congress. 30  As relief, the complaint
23 Fund For Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir.
2006). According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, a watershed is "the land
area that drains water to a particular stream, river, or lake." U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Water Science Glossary of Terms,
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html#W (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).24 Fundfor Animals, 460 F.3d at 16.
25 Id. at 16-17.
26 Id. at 17. The field offices proceeded on a herd-by-herd basis, and used a "common
population model" to "determine how many animals to remove based on an initial four-
year gather schedule." Id. "[F]inal determinations concerning the number of animals to
remove and the timing of such removals was left to the field offices to determine based
on the particular characteristics of each herd and geography." Id.27 Id. The other parties included the Animal Legal Defense Fund. Id.28 id.
29 Id. (emphasis in original).30 Id. The complaint also challenged the Bureau's "pattern, practice and policy of
removing wild horses and burros pursuant to the Restoration Strategy." Id (emphasis in
original) (opinion does not address this claim separately).
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requested an injunction against the Bureau's continuing implementation of
the strategy.31
As the complaint was pending in 2002, an "Instruction
Memorandum" was issued by the Bureau's assistant director to the local
field offices. 32 The message of the memorandum was to "communicate
guidance and policy regarding how the Bureau would achieve [appropriate
management levels] in herd management areas by 2005"33 and included a
chart estimating the number of horses to be removed from each state.34
According to the memorandum, "horses five years and younger would be
removed first, those ten years and older next, followed by horses six to
nine years of age." 35 Field offices would be required to collect data on
each herd and prepare a "Population Management Plan" detailing the
"population objectives for the herd[s] and the rationale for those
objectives."36 As articulated in the memorandum itself, the procedures
were to take effect immediately upon receipt and expired on September
30, 2003.37 The memorandum explained that "the Bureau's policy
regarding the removal of wild horses is reviewed and revised each year in
an effort to balance the need to achieve [appropriate management levels],
minimize the time excess animals are held in [the Bureau's] facilities
awaiting adoption and enhance [the Bureau's] ability to place those
animals into private maintenance and care."38
In response to the Bureau's Memorandum, Fund For Animals filed
a "Supplemental Complaint," alleging that "before the memorandum
became effective the Bureau was bound to issue an environmental impact
statement or an environmental assessment."39 Under the Supplemental








Id As set forth in the Bureau's Manual, instruction memoranda "are of a short-term,
temporary nature" and are "in effect for a short period of time." Id.
39 Id.
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permanent injunction against the Bureau.40 The effect of the injunction
would be to prohibit the Bureau from taking any steps to "implement the
memorandum" and require the Bureau to prepare an environmental impact
statement pursuant to NEPA. 4 1
In the district court, Fund For Animals filed a motion for summary
judgment, and the Bureau filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, or
in the alternative, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
42jurisdiction. The Bureau's motion to dismiss argued that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Bureau's strategy because,
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), only a final agency
action is subject to judicial review, and the Bureau's strategy does not
constitute a final agency action.43 The motion also argued that the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint regarding the challenged gathers
because the gathers had already been completed at the time of trial,
rendering the issue moot.44 In response, Fund For Animals argued that the
strategy did constitute a final agency action because it was of "general ...
applicability and future effect," 45 and it was "binding on all of the state
office [decisions]."46
The district court, relyin on the precedent established in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, another APA final agency review
decision, concluded that the type of relief that Funds For Animals was
seeking was the same type of prohibited relief described in Lujan as
"wholesale improvement."4 8 In Lujan, the Supreme Court held that "the
final agency action requirement of the APA bars federal jurisdiction over
suits for broad programmatic relief."4 9 The district court held that because
"further decisionmaking on the part of the [Bureau's] state offices is
40 d.
41 id.






47497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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required prior to any implementation of the [s]trategy's goals or
guidelines,"5 o and the strategy "is not the type of decision that will directly
affect the parties because further agency action is necessary before any
concrete action will be taken by the agency that might affect the rights of
the plaintiffs," 5' the Bureau's strategy was not a final agency action. 52
The district court also held that because the seven challenged gathers were
completed, and Fund For Animals no longer had a redressable injury, the
controversy is moot, leaving the court with no jurisdiction over the
claim.53  Therefore, all claims brought by Fund For Animals were
dismissed.54
Fund For Animals appealed the decision to the United States Court
of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, claiming that two of the
Bureau's documents constituted a final agency action.55 Regarding the
first document in question, the Bureau's Memorandum, the Court of
Appeals noted that the only claim made by Fund For Animals in its
Supplemental Complaint was that the Bureau's memorandum was "issued
in violation of the NEPA."56 Although the Bureau conceded that "the
general national planning approach set forth in the February 2002
memorandum continues to serve as guidance to the field for the conduct of
specific gather and removal decisions,"57 the Court held that because the
memorandum stated in its own terms that it was a "short-term, temporary"
document and at the time of trial had already expired, the Fund For
Animal's claim was moot.58
The second document that Fund For Animals claimed constituted a
final agency action was the Bureau's Presidential Budget Initiative.
50 Id.
5 Id.52id
5 Id. 357 F. Supp. 2d at 230.
54 id
5 Fund For Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
56 id.
5 1 d. at 18-19.
58 Id. at 18. The Court placed little weight on the Bureau's concession. Id. at 19. The
Court agrees with the Bureau in that "the record provides no evidence of [the
Memorandum's] continued implementation." Id
59 Id
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When examining the Initiative, the Court explained that "the agency's
proposal to Congress, developed to secure the funds, may serve as a useful
planning document, but it is not a 'rule'-that is, 'an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy."' 60 The Court further noted that the
Initiative is not an "order," "license," "sanction," or "relief."61
Precedent played a large role in the Court of Appeal's analysis.
Like the District Court, the Court of Ap eals also relied on Lujan's broad
"programmatic" statement prohibition.2 The Court of Appeals also
looked at the analogous case of Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance,63 which presented a similar APA claim under the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 .6 In Norton, the Supreme Court
held that the land use plans at issue did not constitute "agency action," and
the plans themselves are "generally unreviewable." 65 The Supreme Court
noted in that case that "only specific actions implementing the plans ...
are subject to strict scrutiny."6 Because the Court of Appeals found these
cases analogous with respect to the agency action determination, the Court
held that the Initiative, which operated much like a land use plan, did not
constitute an agency action within the meaning of the APA and was
therefore unreviewable. 67
With respect to Fund For Animal's objection to the seven specific
gathers, the Court of Appeals deemed the issue moot because the gathers
had already been completed, and it was "impossible for the court to grant
any effectual relief."6 The Court rejected Fund For Animal's claim that
the gathers represented issues or wrongs capable of repetition yet evading
review, noting that "[p]articular decisions to remove wild horses and
burros are highly fact-specific," 69 and "[i]f there are to be more roundups
6 Id. at 20 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000)).
61 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000)).
62 id.
63 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
6 Fund For Animals, 460 F.3d at 21.
65 id.
6 Id.
6 7 Id. at 21-22.61Id. at 22.69 Id.
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in the future-itself an open question-it remains to be seen whether they
will be of the same magnitude as those which have come before, and
whether the same criteria are applied."70
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that Fund For Animal's
NEPA claim against the Bureau was moot, the Bureau's Memorandum
and Initiative did not constitute an agency action under the APA, and Fund
For Animal's objection to the seven specific gathers was moot, and the
capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness
doctrine did not apply.7'
1II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
Congress passed the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
("Act") in 1971 in response to the declining wild horse and burro
populations in the United States.72 Because Congress considered the wild
horses and burros to be "an integral part of the natural system of the public
lands,"73 the statute gave the animals protection from "capture, branding,
harassment, or death." 74 Under the Act, "wild free-roaming horses and
burros" refers to "all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on
public lands of the United States."75
The Act grants the Secretary of the Interior jurisdiction over all
wild free-roaming horses and burros.76 The Secretary is also responsible
70 id. at 23.
71 Id. at 13.
72 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
3 Id. Congress declared that
Wild free-roaming horses and burros are living symbols of the historic and
pioneer spirit of the West ... they contribute to the diversity of life forms within
the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people; and that these horses
and burros are fast disappearing from the American scene.
Id.
74 d
71 16 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
76 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2000).
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for the management of the Act's various provisions.77 The Secretary must
"designate and maintain specific ranges on public lands as sanctuaries for
their protection and preservation"78 and "maintain a current inventory of
wild free-roaming horses and burros on given areas of the public lands." 79
The inventory helps the Secretary
make determinations as to whether and where an overpopulation
exists and whether action should be taken to remove excess
animals; determine appropriate management levels of wild free-
roaming horses and burros on these areas of the public lands; and
determine whether appropriate management levels should be
achieved by the removal or destruction of excess animals, or other
options (such as sterilization, or natural controls on population
levels). 80
If and when the Secretary determines that "an overpopulation exists" and
"action is necessary to remove excess animals," 8 1 the Secretary must take
immediate action to achieve appropriate management levels. 82  Such
action may include ordering "old, sick, or lame animals to be destroyed in
the most humane manner possible,"83 allowing "additional excess wild
free-roaming horses and burros to be humanely captured and removed" for
adoption,84 and allowing those excess horses and burros that are not
adopted "to be destroyed in the most humane and cost efficient manner
7 Id. The Act's reference to "Secretary" actually refers to "the Secretary of the Interior
when used in connection with public lands administered by him through the Bureau of
Land Management and the Secretary of Agriculture in connection with public lands
administered by him through the Forest Service." 16 U.S.C. § 1332.
78 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a).
7 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1).80 id.
8116 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (2000).82 d
3 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(A).
' 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(B). In order for a horse or burro to be adopted, the Secretary
must find that an adoption demand exists by "qualified individuals" who can assure that
they will provide "humane treatment and care (including proper transportation, feeding,
and handling)." Id. No one individual may adopt more than four horses or burros per
year, unless the Secretary finds that the individual can provide the appropriate level of
care to more than four horses. Id.
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possible."85 The Secretary may also sell the horse or burro under certain
conditions. 86
In addition to outlining the Secretary's power and duties, the Act
also creates criminal penalties for various violations.87 These violations
include: "willfully remov[ing] or attempts to remove a wild free-roaming
horse or burro from the public lands, without authority from the
Secretary,"88 converting a horse or burro for private use without
permission from the Secretary,89 "maliciously caus[ing] the death or
harassment of any wild free-roaming horse or burro,"90 processing wild
horse or burro remains into "commercial products," 91 directly or indirectly
selling a wild horse or burro,92 or other willful violations of the Act's
93regulations. The Act's prescribed punishments include a fine of no more
than $2,000, imprisonment of no more than one year, or both. 94
B. Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") was designed to allow
judicial review of agency actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Under the APA,
"[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."95  Only a "final agency
action" is subject to judicial review. 96  Defined elsewhere, an "agency
action" includes "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
8' 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(C).
86 An excess horse or burrow may be sold if it is more than ten years old or "has been
offered unsuccessfully for adoption at least [three] times." 16 U.S.C. § 1333(e).
87 16 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
" Id. at § 1338(a)(1).
9Id. at § 1338(a)(2).
9 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(3).
9 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(4).
92 16 U.S.C. § 1338((a)(5).
9 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(6).
94 id.
9 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
96 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
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sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 97 in
order for an "agency action" to be considered "final," the test is "whether
the agency has completed its decision making process, and whether the
result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties." 98
C. "Capable ofRepetition Yet Evading Review"
About a year before the Fund For Animals decision, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the application of the
mootness exception doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review"
in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Glittens
("PETA").99 In that case, PETA brought an action against the District of
Columbia, alleging that the District's refusal to admit PETA's designs into
a city-wide art exhibit was a violation of its freedom of speech. 00
However, the Court never reached the merits of the Constitutional issue
because it determined that the claim was moot and declined to apply the
"capable of repetition yet evading review" exception.' 0' Finding the claim
over PETA's donkey and elephant exhibits highly fact-specific, the Court
relied upon the idea that "[flor a controversy or wrong to be 'capable of
repetition,' there must be at least 'a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." 0 2 The
Court concluded that because "[t]he essential point is that the case before
us is highly dependent upon a series of facts unlikely to be duplicated in
the future," the claim was moot and the exception of "capable of repetition
yet evading review" did not apply.103
9 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000).98 Fund For Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 357 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228
(D.D.C. 2004)(citing Franklin v. Mass., 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992)).
9 9PETA, 396 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
"Id at 387.
101 Id at 388.
102 Id at 393 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).
103 Id at 424.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Fund
For Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau for Land Management 104 held that
because both Fund For Animals' NEPA claim against the Bureau and
Fund For Animals' request for a permanent injunction were moot, and the
Bureau's approved budget request was not an "agency action," Fund For
Animals no longer had any "justiciable agency action" against the Bureau.
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment for the
Bureau.s05 The Court of Appeals also held that the "capable of repetition
yet evading review" exception to the doctrine of mootness did not apply to
Fund For Animals' request for a permanent injunction.106
A. Majority Decision
The Court began its analysis with an acknowledgment that neither
the Wild Horses and Burros Act nor the NEPA contained a specific
statutory review provision, as such, review of an administrative action was
only appropriate when there had been an "agency action" or "final agency
action." 0 7 The Court then chose to address the question of whether the
Bureau's challenged actions were considered "agency action(s)" in order
to determine whether Fund For Animals' claims were justiciable.'os The
"final action" analysis involved two documents: the Bureau's Instruction
Memorandum and the Presidential Budget Initiative.109
The first disputed document that Fund For Animals claimed was a
"final agency action" was the Bureau's Instruction Memorandum. The
Court quickly dispensed of this portion of Fund For Animals' claim,
holding that because the memorandum itself stated that it would expire on
104 Fund For Animals, 460 F.3d 13.
10 Id. at 23.
1o6 id.107 Id. at 18. Under the APA, when there is no specific statutory review provision, the
APA provides a "generic cause of action to 'a person suffering legal wrong because of




Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 15, No. 1
September 30, 2003, the challenge was moot.110 Even though the Bureau
conceded that "the general national planning approach set forth in the
February 2002 memorandum continue[d] to serve as guidance to the field
for the conduct of specific gather and removal decisions,""' the Court
found that this concession "cannot support the weight the Fund would
place on it."112
After disposing of the Instruction Memorandum, the Court next
considered whether the Bureau's Presidential Budget Initiative constituted
an "agency action" or "final agency action." The Court first looked to the
precise language of §§ 702 and 704 of the APA, noting that the APA's
definition of an "agency action" included an expansive list." 3 The Court
held that because the Presidential Budget Initiative did not "implement,
interpret, or prescribe" any "law or policy," and because it is not an
"order. . . license. . . sanction. . . or relief," the Presidential Budget
Initiative was not an "agency action" for purposes of judicial review under
the APA.114
The Court was also concerned about contravening the precedent
established by Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation"5 and Norton v.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.116 Lujan and Norton both involved
challenges to land use plans authorized under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act. In those cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held "the plans
themselves are generally unreviewable; it is only specific actions
implementing the plans that are the subject of judicial scrutiny."'' 7
Borrowing from Lujan, the Court found that the Bureau's Presidential
Budget Initiative was a "broad programmatic statement" not capable of
" Id. at 18-19.
" Id. at 19.
113 Id. The portions of the APA that the Court referred to defined an "agency action" as
"the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000)). The APA also defines "agency
action" as "an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).114 Fund For Animals, Inc., 460 at 20.
1 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
"1 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
" Fund For Animals, Inc., 460 at 2 1.
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judicial review.118  The Court also found that the Presidential Budget
Initiative failed to satisfy Norton's requirement that there must be a
"discrete agency action" before judicial review is appropriate."l 9 Relying
heavily on precedent, the Court adhered to its "long-standing practice in
circumstances like this . . . to require the complaining party to challenge
the specific implementation of the broader agency policy." 20
The last claim that the Court addressed was Fund For Animals'
objection to the seven specific gathers and its request for a permanent
injunction enjoining the Bureau from taking any further actions regarding
its restoration strategy. The Court initially noted that because the specific
gathers were carried out in accordance with the Bureau's Restoration
Strategy and they had already been completed, it would be impossible to
grant a permanent injunction against these gathers.121 In response to Fund
For Animals' claim that the "capable of repetition yet evading review"
exception should apply, the Court held that because the appropriate
management for a given herd is extremely fact-specific and the strategy
was limited in time, the exception did not apply.12 2
B. Dissenting Opinion
Conceding that the Bureau's Presidential Budget Initiative in and
of itself was not a "final agency action" for purposes of judicial review
under the APA, the dissent disagreed with the majority's treatment of the
Bureau's Instruction Memorandum.123 The dissent argued that Fund For
18 Id. at 20.
"9 1d. at 21.
120 Id. at 22. Other cases to which the Court cites are: Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Indep. Petroleum Ass'n ofAm. v. Babbitt, 235 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir.
2001); DRG Funding Corp. v. Secretary ofHousing and Urban Development, 76 F.3d
1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003); AT&T Co. v. EEOC, 270 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir.
2001); and Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
121 Fund For Animals, Inc., 460 F. 3d at 22.
122 Id. at 23. The Court again cites to an analogous case, People for the Ethical
Treatment ofAnimals, Inc. v. Gittens, which held that the "essential point is that the case
before us is highly dependent upon a series of facts unlikely to be duplicated in the
future." PETA v. Gittens, 396 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
123 Fund For Animals, 460 F. 3d at 23.
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Animals' claim regarding the Instruction Memorandum was dismissed on
an improperly raised mootness claim.124 Because the majority raised the
mootness claim sua sponte, the majority never gave the Bureau or Fund
For Animals the opportunity to develop the argument.' 2 5
Furthermore, the dissent argued that the majority improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau on the issue of
mootness without giving both parties a chance to develop the issue.126
The standard for summary judgment, as articulated by the dissent, was for
the court to "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor."l 27
According to the dissent, the majority did not follow this maxim because it
disregarded the Bureau's own acknowledgment that the "general national
planning approach set forth in the February 2002 [M]emorandum
continues to serve as guidance to the field," and the Instruction
Memorandum was "intended .. . to provide guidance for the national wild
horse and burro program for some unspecified period of time."' The
dissent found the majority's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Bureau "particularly problematic because it comes on appeal, with the
Fund having had no notice of the majority's argument or possibility of
seeking discovery or introducing evidence in response."' 29
The dissent also believed that, contrary to the normal rules
regarding mootness, the majority improperly shifted the burden on Fund
For Animals to show that the Instruction Memorandum's strategy had
expired.130 The dissent noted that the Bureau had made no attempt to
persuade the court that the strategies implemented by the Instruction
Memorandum had in fact expired and were no longer being practiced.' 3 '
124 id
12s Id. at 24.
126
127 Id. at 25.
128 id. at 24.
29 Id. at 25.
130 Id. "[I]t is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice
does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice
except when the defendant meets its heavy burden of persuading the court that the
challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again." Id. (quoting Worth
v. Jackson, 451 F.3d 854, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted).
131 Id.
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This did not mean that the Bureau would have necessarily failed to meet
its burden, but that the Bureau should have been given the opportunity to
try.' 32
Finally, the dissent argued that under the two-part test articulated
in Bennett v. Spear1 33 the Bureau's Instruction Memorandum would
constitute a "final agency action" under § 704 of the APA.134 Under the
Bennett test, the Instruction Memorandum "mark[ed] the consummation of
the agency's decisionmaking process," and it was "one by which rights or
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will
flow." 35 The dissent also added that if applied properly, Lujan would
support the same result, because in that case there was no "discrete
program to review."l 36
Although the dissent agreed with the majority's treatment of the
Bureau's Presidential Budget Initiative, it ultimately disagreed with the
majority's treatment of the summary judgment motion. The dissent would
have used the Bennett test to analyze whether the Instruction
Memorandum constituted a "final agency action" for purposes of judicial
review. To resolve the issue of mootness, the dissent would have given
both parties the chance to research and brief the issue while keeping the
burden of proof on the Bureau.
V. COMMENT
After holding that the Bureau's "Instruction Memorandum" and
"Presidential Budget Initiative" are not eligible for judicial review under
the APA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia suggested that
the proper way for Fund For Animals, and other similarly situated
plaintiffs, to obtain relief is to challenge the individual gathers
implemented under the Bureau's strategy.13 However, in reality, the
Court has foreclosed this theory by failing to apply the mootness doctrine
132 Id. at 26.
133 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
134 Fund For Animals, Inc., 460 F. 3d at 28.35id.
Id. at 29.
n Id at 20.
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of "capable of repetition yet evading review."1 38 The Court's decision on
this issue was not well-justified, given the limited discussion in the
opinion and its misinterpretation of precedent. Furthermore, a comparison
between the Memorandum at issue and its predecessor reveal that the
Bureau continued to implement the strategies controlling the challenged
gathers, thus ensuring that the gathers complained of were likely to be
duplicated.
The Court spends too little time on the mootness claim,' 39
dismissing or completely ignoring important considerations raised by
Fund For Animals in its Reply Brief. First, Fund For Animals points out
that the Bureau admitted that "the general national planning approach set
forth in the February 2002 memorandum continues to serve as guidance to
the field for the conduct of specific gather and removal decisions."l 4 o But,
the Court determines that "this is hardly 'evidence' that the expiration date
does not mean what it says."l41 Also included in Fund For Animals'
Reply Brief was a response to the Bureau's argument that the gathers had
been completed before the complaint was filed.142 Fund For Animals
brought to the Court's attention that at the time the complaint was
originally filed, one of the gathers had not yet begun, five of the other
gathers had not yet met their authorized targets (meaning that more horses
would need to be removed), and the last gather was not completed until
2002, months after the complaint had been filed.14 3 Because the Court did
not give proper consideration to Fund For Animals' arguments that some
of the gathers were ongoing at the time suit was filed and the Bureau itself
admitted to using the memorandum for guidance after its expiration date,
the Court's dismissal of Fund For Animals' mootness claim is careless and
tenuous.
The Court's decision was also a product of misinterpreted
precedent. The test to which the Court pointed in determining whether an
8 Id. at 22.
139 Out of an approximate twenty-three page opinion, the Court's discussion of this part
of the overall claim takes up less than a page. Id. at 22-23.
" Id. at 18-19.
141 Id. at 19 n.6.
142 Reply Brief of Appellants at 11-12, Fund For Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5359).
13id.
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issue is "capable of repetition yet evading review" does not automatically
dispose of the issue. Under People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
Inc. v. Gittens,'" the mootness exception does not apply when the
"essential point is that the case before [the court] is highly dependent upon
a series of facts unlikely to be duplicated in the future."l 4 5 Although the
individual gather decisions were fact-specific, they were all implemented
according to the same strategy. And even though this particular strategy
had an expiration date, if the fundamental concepts driving that strategy
reappear in subsequent Bureau strategies, then the end results of those
gathers are likely to be duplicated in the future. Proper determination of
the mootness exception would require the Court to apply the test in its
entirety by considering whether the gathers were likely to be duplicated in
the future. Had the Court followed the test exactly, the "capable of
repetition yet evading review" claim might have stood a chance.
A determination of whether these facts are likely to be duplicated
in the future could be achieved through a comparison of the Memorandum
at issue in the instant case with subsequent Memoranda promulgated by
the Bureau. When comparing the "Gather Policy and Selective Removal
Criteria" from the Memorandum at issue (2002) with its successor (issued
in 2005), the criteria used in selecting wild horses for removal are
extremely similar. Both policies primarily use the age of the wild horse as
the sole determining factor for removal.146  For example, under both
Memoranda the wild horses are divided into age classes.' As laid out in
the Memoranda, younger horses, classified as those horses five years old
or younger, are automatically eligible for removal, while the older horses
are to be removed as a last resort after the removal of younger horses has
'"PETA, 396 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
145 Id. at 424.
'4 U.S DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGNT., INSTRUCTION
MEMORANDUM No. 2002-095, 4 (2002), http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy02/im2002-
095.html; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No. 2005-206, 5 (2005)
http://www.bln.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy05/im2005-206.htm.
147 INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No. 2002-095, at 4; INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No.
2005-206, at 5.
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been exhausted.14 8 The Memoranda are also similar in the mandates for
"unadoptable" wild horses. 149 Under both Memoranda, horses that are not
otherwise eligible for adoption because of disease, congenital or genetic
defects, physical defects due to previous injury, or recent but not life
threatening injuries, are to be released to the range. 50 When considering
whether an issue is "capable of repetition yet evading review," it is
essential to ask whether the facts are likely to be duplicated in the future.
This could have easily been done in the present case with a simple
comparison of the memorandum at issue and its successor.
Taking into consideration the Bureau's own concession that the
strategies articulated by the 2002 Instruction Memorandum continue to
guide and influence subsequent strategies, and the fact that subsequent
Memoranda continue to implement arguably identical selective removal
requirements, it becomes clear that the gathers to which Fund For Animals
objected-even though they had already been completed-were not only
likely to be duplicated in the future but were also "capable of repetition."
By prohibiting the application of this exception to the case at hand, the
Court has in effect foreclosed the Bureau from successfully challenging
future gathers conducted by the Bureau under the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
When Fund For Animals challenged the Bureau's strategies
implementing the Wild Horses and Burros Act, its suit not only challenged
the Bureau's adopted policies articulated in the Instruction Memorandum
and Presidential Budget Initiative; it also challenged the individual gathers
which the Bureau had carried out under the authority of those policies.
Fund For Animals seemed to have anticipated the court's reluctance to
judicially review the Bureau's general policies and strategies, so it
included the individual gathers in the suit to provide the court with a
concrete agency action. Little did Fund For Animals know that the court
148 INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No. 2002-095, at 4-5; INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No.
2005-206, at 5.
149 INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No. 2002-095, at 5; INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM NO.
2005-206, at 4.
50 INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2002-095, at 5; INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No.
2005-206, at 4.
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would take a narrow and rigid approach to the mootness issue and refuse
to apply an exception. The "capable of repetition yet evading review"
doctrine should not be applied in every case where the challenged action
has already happened, but in cases like the one at hand, it would have been
proper for the court to investigate the Bureau's ongoing policies to
determine if the same violations of the Act were likely to repeat
themselves in the future.
The message that this decision sends to future plaintiffs seeking to
challenge the Bureau's administration of the Act is: timing is everything.
A potential plaintiff must not only wait until the Bureau starts making
gathers (otherwise it is not a "final agency action" capable of judicial
review), but then the plaintiff must act fast (before the gathers are finished
and the claim becomes moot). Even if it were possible for any plaintiff to
bring a claim within this small window of time, the difficulty in bringing
successful claims under the Act seems to fly in the face of the original
purpose of the Act-not to protect the Bureau from messy litigation, but to
protect the wild horses and burros.
AMY L. GLEGHORN
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